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Imagine a great wave is rising and I have dashed into the sea with my surfboard.
You know nothing about me: perhaps I am one of the world’s great surfers; perhaps
I am a fool. What would it tell you about my abilities, if I were ride into the coast
on that wave? Would it mean I am able to surf a wave like that? Does success entail
ability?
Call the principle that it does Success.1 When we focus on successful action,
Success is compelling. Austin (1961) said that “it follows merely from the premise
that [a golfer sinks a putt], that he has the ability to do it, according to ordinary
English”. And indeed when someone succeeds in something, like sinking a putt
or surfing a wave, one is forced to concede they were able to do that. This is what
Success would lead us to expect.
But when success is not yet assured, the lesson seems different. When said
before the fact, the claim that I can surf that wave is strong — it says that surfing that
wave is within my control. This intuition, call it the control intuition, drives against
Success. Just doing something does not demonstrate it is within my control: flukes
do happen. So, if the control intuition is right, success should not demonstrate
ability.
∗Thanks to the participants of the Rutgers Language Workshop, and Fabrizio Cariani, Justin Khoo,
Jeff King, Annina Loets, Matthew Mandelkern, Milo Phillips-Brown, Robert Stalnaker, and Barbara
Vetter. Special thanks to Ginger Schultheis for comments on multiple drafts.
1I will focus exclusively on whether Success is valid for specific ability attributions which concern
whether an agent is able to perform an action at a particular time (generally in the future), like lifting
200 pounds right now or hitting a bullseye on this throw. These are to be contrasted with general or
generic ability ascriptions, which say that an agent has the ability to perform an action, not at a specific
time, but rather in general. Mandelkern et al. (2017) argue that the semantics for generic ability
ascriptions is derived by simply embedding a specific ability ascription under a generic operator.
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To resolve this tension, I connect abilities to the Aristotelian notion that while
the past is settled, the future is open. What one is able to do, on my account, depends
on what will happen, if one performs certain actions; and what will happen, various
philosophers and semanticists have argued, depends on what is settled and what is
open. This connection to the open future yields a plausible diagnosis of Success:
on my account, success does not strictly speaking entail ability; but other closely
related principles are valid.
Here is the plan for the paper. First I try to make the above tension precise. I
argue that the appeal of Success is connected to two plausible and related principles:
that past success entails past ability, which I call Past Success; and that cannot
seems to entail will not, which I call Can’t-entails-won’t. But, on the other, I show
that the control intuition gives rise to counterexamples to Success in cases of inexact
ability discussed by Kenny (1976). This tension runs deep: no existing account of
abilities, not even those developed in response to Kenny, makes sense of all three
points together.
To explain these data, I maintain we must connect the truth of ability claims to
the facts about what our options settle and what they leave open, in the sense familiar
from the literature on future contingents. I do this within a kind of conditional
analysis of ability ascriptions. I first define an operatorW with features attributed
to ‘will’ in the literature on future contingents. In particular,Wφ is indeterminate
in truth-value, when φ is unsettled. Building on previous work in Mandelkern et al.
(2017), I state my conditional analysis in terms of W-conditionals: on my view,
⌜S can φ⌝ says, roughly, there’s some action available to S such that if S does it,
then W(S φ)’s is true. By thus building a connection between unsettledness and
indeterminacy into ability claims, my conditional account of abilities reconciles the
motivations for Success with its counterexamples.
1 The Status of Success
Ability modals are, unsurprisingly, most naturally expressed in English with ‘is able
to’:
(1) I am able to surf that wave.
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They can also be naturally expressed with the modal ‘can’:
(2) I can surf that wave.
Success is a principle governing the logic of ability modals. Formally put, it says:
Success. S φ S can φ
Both in Success and later on in my semantics, I focus exclusively on the ability
reading of ‘can’; I set aside circumstantial, epistemic and deontic uses.2
2There is actually a somewhat subtle question here about what kind of expression ⌜S φ⌝ is in the
statement of Success. It is crucial that ⌜S φ⌝ be the modal’s prejacent. But it is generally thought that
root modals, such as ability modals, are syntactically below tense. (See Cinque (1999) and Hacquard
(2006).) This means that ability modals combine with tenseless phrases and, as a result, strictly
speaking the premise of Success is a tenseless phrase that expresses a proposition. (Though note that
this does not mean that ⌜S φ⌝ does not make any reference to times; not all temporal reference is
through tense.) This is why I have deliberately omitted any tense marking on ⌜S φ⌝.
Tenseless phrases are not grammatical sentences of English; they are grammatical subsentential
expressions. But they often have the same semantic value of grammatical tensed sentences of English;
and so to assess instances of Success and my other principles we will instead assess those sentential
paraphrases. Consider the sentence:
(i) He can hit the dartboard on the next shot.
Here the prejacent of the modal is a tenseless phrase like:
(ii) He hit the dartboard on the next shot.
I assume (at least until the end of §1.2) that this tenseless phrase expresses the same proposition as
the tensed sentence:
(iii) He will hit the dartboard on the next shot.
So to assess the instance of Success:
He hit the dartboard on the next shot He can hit the dartboard on the next shot.
we can consider whether it is possible for (i) to be false (or not true) while (iii) is true. More generally,
the methodology throughout will be to assess the relevant principles by finding grammatical tensed
analogues of the premises and conclusions, where necessary. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
pushing me to clarify this issue.
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1.1 The Appeal of Success
Two facts are easy to explain, if Success is valid and hard to explain otherwise.
To appreciate the first, let’s focus on relatively mundane cases inspired by Kenny
(1976)’s discussion of abilities:
Fluky Dartboard. I am a terrible dartplayer. I struggle to even hit the
board whenever I take a shot. However, I take my shot and I flukily hit
the bullseye.
Once I have taken the shot and hit the bullseye, I can compellingly argue:
(3) I hit the bullseye on that throw.
So, I was able to hit the bullseye on that throw.
If you know that I have been successful, you must concede I was able to.3
This is our first point in favour of Success: past success feels like it entails past
ability. Where ↝ denotes a felt entailment, we have:4
Past Success. PAST (S φ) ↝ PAST (S can φ)
This seems like strong motivation for Success itself. How could Past Success be
valid, if Success is not? After all, I haven’t changed since I hit the bullseye. My
abilities are what they were some moments ago.
The second fact is that it sounds incoherent to affirm or leave open the premise
of Success, but deny the conclusion. Consider:
(4) # I can’t hit the bullseye on this shot, but I will.
3Relatedly, Maier (2018) observes that, in cases like Fluky Dartboard it is hard to say whether
the agent has the ability to hit a bullseye. I think Maier’s observation is well explained in terms of
mine: when asked whether I have the ability we are torn between two considerations: there is true,
past specific reading that says I was able to hit the dartboard; but there is also a generic reading on
which it is not true that I am able to hit the bullseye.
However, my problem goes beyond Maier’s observation and cannot be solved using the
generic/specific distinction. My observations strongly support that Past Success, the failure of ∨-
Success and Can’t-Entails-Won’t all apply to specific abilities: all of my examples use ability ascrip-
tions with a specific prejacent. And so long as we can isolate a single type of reading that all these
principles apply to, we will have the problems identified in §1.3.
4This is something like the converse of the actuality entailments discussed by Bhatt (1999) and
Hacquard (2006).
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(5) # I can’t hit the bullseye on this shot, but I might.
As I invite you to verify, in general sentences of the form ⌜S can’tφ but willφ⌝ sound
absurd.
This is our second point in favour of Success. In general, it seems that can’t
entails won’t:
Can’t-entails-won’t. ¬(S can φ) ↝ ¬(S φ)
And Can’t-entails-won’t is just the contrapositive of Success.
1.2 A Counterexample to Success
That is the case for Success, as I see it. But at the end of the day, I think it cannot
be valid. Recall the control intuition: if I say something like
(6) I can hit the bullseye on this throw.
I say something quite strong. (6) is not verified by the small chance of me hitting
the dartboard.
We can leverage this intuition to find counterexamples to Success. Take the
following variation on the dartboard case inspired by Kenny (1976):5
Unreliable Dartboard. I am a fairly bad dartplayer. I regularly hit the
bottom half when I aim for the top; and vice versa. But I never miss
the board entirely.
I am about to take a shot. I am skilled enough to know I will hit the board; so I
know the following:
(7) I will hit the top half of the board on the next shot or I will hit the bottom
half of the board on this throw.
5This argument is closely related to Kenny’s point that ability modals fail to distribute across
disjunction. I am indebted to Fusco (2021) here, which directed my attention specifically to ∨-Success
(though her focus is not the status of Success). However, see the end of §1.3 for discussion of how
my puzzle goes beyond Kenny’s point.
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But it does not seem that I should ascribe myself either of the following abilities
here:
(8) I can hit the top on the throw.
(9) I can hit the bottom on this throw.
Even the disjunction does not seem true:
(10) I can hit the top of the board on this throw or I can hit the bottom of the
board on this throw.
So, in advance of the shot, even if I know I will hit the board somewhere, I do not
have the ability to hit the top or the ability to hit the bottom.
But I would be predicted to have one ability or the other if Success were valid.
For I will hit either the top or the bottom of the dartboard. In the first case, Success
says I’m able to hit the top, in the second that I’m able to hit the bottom. In either
case (10) should be true, if Success is valid. But it is not.
Here is that argument again, with all the steps made explicit:
1. I will hit the top half of the board on the next shot or I will hit the bottom half
of the board on this throw. (Premise)
2. I will hit the top half of the board on the next shot. (Assumption for
Conditional Proof)
3. I can hit the top half of the board on the next shot. (Success, (2))
4. I will hit the top half of the board on the next shot ⊃ I can hit the top half of
the board on the next shot. (Conditional Proof, (2), (3))
5. I will hit the bottom half of the board on the next shot. (Assumption for
Conditional Proof)
6. I can hit the bottom half of the board on the next shot. (Success,(5))
7. I will hit the bottom half of the board on the next shot ⊃ I can hit the bottom
half of the board on the next shot. (Conditional Proof, (5), (6))
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8. I can hit the top half of the board on the next shot or I can hit the bottom half
of the board on the next shot. (Constructive Dilemma, (1), (4), (7))
All steps but two appeal to highly plausible principles of classical logic; the clear
weak links are the appeals to Success at steps (3) and (6).6
The consequences of Success become more absurd as the disjunctions get longer.
Suppose we divide the dartboard into a million tiny, numbered regions. I can see
that I will hit (at least) one of these regions because I know I will hit the dartboard,
yielding:
(11) I will hit region 1 or 2 or 3 or ... or 1,000,000 on this throw.
If Success is valid, then the following incredible claim is true:
(12) I can hit region 1 on this throw or I can hit region 2 on this throw or ... or
I can hit region 1,000,000 on this throw.
And, to put an even finer point on it, notice that each disjunct of (12) entails:7
(13) There is a certain point that I can hit on this throw.
Success predicts that (13) should just be a truism here. In fact, (13) would be an
incredible boast for me to make in Unreliable Dartboard.
So you can be sure that you will make true some disjunction, while failing to
have the ability to make true either disjunct. This gives us the failure of the following
inference pattern:
∨- Success. S φ ∨ S ψ   S can φ ∨ S can ψ
And, as we saw, ∨-Success is a consequence of Success, given natural classical
forms of reasoning.
6The other classical principles are not completely beyond reproach. Informational accounts of
logic, as defended in Yalcin (2007) and Bledin (2014), deny Constructive Dilemma. However, Con-
structive Dilemma will be valid even on informational approaches when restricted to premises not
containing epistemic vocabulary like epistemic modals or conditionals; so even informational ac-
counts should deny Success here.
7Here I use ‘certain’ to single out the reading where the quantifier takes wide scope.
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One might worry about the tense of the counterexample.8 Success and ∨-
Success are principles governing your present abilities; but my example concerns
the future. How then could Unreliable Dartboard have the form of a counterex-
ample to ∨-Success?
Consider first the conclusion of ∨-Success. This is indeed in the present tense.
But so too are the ability modals in (10). We must distinguish between the tense of
the ability and the time of the embedded action. Consider:
(14) I am able to hit the dartboard on the next shot.
The claim is in the present tense: it is about what I am able to do. Nonetheless
this (present) ability claim concerns future actions: the action hit the dartboard on
the next shot clearly refers to the future. We cannot infer that an ability claim is
not present tensed, simply because it concerns actions in the future. So ∨-Success,
though a principle about one’s present abilities, still governs (present) abilities to
do future actions, like hitting the dartboard on the next shot. Future actions are a
legitimate source of counterexamples to the principle.
What about the premise of ∨-Success? In my example, the premise is not in
the simple present, since it is about the future.9 But ∨-Success does not demand
that the premise be in the present tense. It simply requires that the φ’s and ψ’s
embedded under the modals be the same as those in the premises. If in a given
instance of ∨-Success the φ’s and ψ’s are future oriented, then the premise must be
too. But a future oriented (non-modal) premise cannot be in the simple present; so
the premise of that instance of ∨-Success cannot be in the present. This is exactly
the case in Unreliable Dartboard and so the future directedness of (7) does not
render the example illegitimate.
But perhaps (7) cannot be the premise of an instance of∨-Success, even granting
the point about future directedness. The prejacents of ‘can’ in the conclusion are
something like:
(15) I hit the top of the dartboard on the next shot.
8Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to consider this worry.
9Strictly speaking, it is in the present tense, as English does not have a future tense, but rather the
present-tensed but future-shifting auxiliary ‘will’. So I say instead it is not in the simple present.
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(16) I hit the bottom of the dartboard on the next shot.
These are not the disjuncts in (7).10 Those contain an extra auxiliary, namely will:
(17) I will hit the top of the dartboard on the next shot.
(18) I will hit the bottom of the dartboard on the next shot.
So we might still worry that the φ’s and ψ’s in my example are not uniformly in-
stantiated in the premises and conclusion; they contain extra material.
Many accounts of ‘will’ make no semantic distinction between (15) and (16) on
the one hand and (17) and (18) on the other. If, for instance, ‘will’ is just a forward
shifting temporal operator, then it is a redundant addition to (17) and (18).11 So,
on such an accounts, the above pairs are equivalent and the counterexample goes
through: if either of (17) or (18) is true, then so must one of (15) and (16).
But there is an important class of views that denies the above pairs are equiv-
alent. Some modal accounts of ‘will’, such as those explored by Prior (1967) and
Belnap et al. (2001) say that ⌜Will φ⌝ is true iff φ is settled. Settledness is a stronger
notion than actual future truth; so modal theorists will distinguish between (15) and
(16), on the one hand, and (17) and (18) on the other. One might conclude then that
modal theories offer an escape from the counterexample: the variables in ∨-Success
are not uniformly nor even equivalently instantiated.
Not so. These modal approaches reject the wrong half of the equivalence, at
least for the purposes of evading my counterexample. They say (15) and (16) do
not entail (17) and (18):
(19) S φ at t′  Will (S φ at t
′)
But, as any plausible view of ‘will’ should, they accept the converse:12
10As I discuss in the earlier footnote 2, (15) and (16) are really tenseless phrases.
11The same goes for Cariani and Santorio (2018)’s selection function semantics for ‘will’.
12As noted by Ninan (2021), there are some modal views, particularly in the linguistics literature,
which in fact deny this entailment. For instance, Copley (2009) takes ‘will’ to universally quantify
over normal futures; but since the actual future might be abnormal (20) will fail on her account.
But, as Ninan convincingly argues, this is a substantial problem for such views: ‘will’-claims will
sometimes be true, even if their prejacent turns out to be false, so long as the actual future is not a
normal one. Some further independent evidence for this: if (20) fails, sentences like the following
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(20) Will (S φ at t′) S φ at t′
After all, settledness entails truth.
This is sufficient to reconstruct the counterexample. We saw in Unreliable
Dartboard that (7) is true:13
(7) Either I will hit the top half of the board on the next shot or I will hit the
bottom half of the board on the next shot.
(7) and Constructive Dilemma allow us to derive the disjunction:
(21) I hit the top half of the board on this throw or I hit the bottom half of the
board on this throw.
(21) and (10) together supply the counterexample to ∨-Success, one where we can
now be sure that the φ’s and ψ’s are instantiated univocally.14
1.3 Deepening the Tension
We now have three pieces of data:
can be coherent:
(i) #It will rain tomorrow but it might not rain tomorrow.
For this reason, I constrain my attention to modal views that do validate the above entailment.
13The modal theorist’s last resort here might be to deny (7) and claim only the following wide-scope
will-claim is true:
(i) I will hit the top or the bottom of the dartboard.
This is in fact a prediction of their semantics, as they deny Will Excluded Middle:
Will Excluded Middle. Will φ ∨ Will ¬φ
The plausibility of this prediction is questionable — my truth-value judgements do not distinguish
between (7) and (i). But more importantly, this move still does not defuse the counterexample. Given
the principle (20), we can derive the ‘will’-free (21) directly from (i); the reasoning proceeds the same
from there.
14Going forward I will take the more natural (7) and (10) to constitute the counterexample; the
inclined reader may substitute (21) for (7) throughout.
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Validity of Past Success. PAST (S φ) ↝ PAST (S can φ)
Validity of Can’t-entails-won’t. ¬(S can φ) ↝ ¬(S φ)
Invalidity of ∨- Success. S φ ∨ S ψ   S can φ ∨ S can ψ
Predicting this combination is a serious challenge. I show Past Success and Can’t-
entails-won’t are equivalent to Success given standard assumptions. I will focus on
a particular case study, a standard modal analysis of abilities, for illustration. But
the argument generalises: no existing account has the resources to make sense of
all three of our principles.15,16
The modal analysis of ability ascriptions, defended by Hilpinen (1969), Lewis
(1976), Kratzer (1977) and Kratzer (1981), says that ‘can’ is a standard possibility
modal, like ‘might’ or ‘is possible’: ⌜S can φ⌝ is true iff, within some set of acces-
sible worlds, there is some possible world where S φ’s. The accessible worlds are
generally taken to be circumstantially possible worlds that hold fixed the intrinsic
properties of the agent. More precisely, where A(w) is the set of accessible worlds
at w:17
Modal Analysis. Jcan (S φ)Kw= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ A(w) ∶ JS φKw′= 1.
15An anonymous referee notes an interesting and similar puzzle regarding estimations of skill. In
Fluky Dartboard it initially seems right to say that I am a terrible dartplayer. But if I go on to then
hit the dartboard, this seems to put pressure on my claim in retrospect.
Unlike my puzzle, I think this one should be solved epistemically. There is indeed a tendency to
infer that I do not (determinately) have the ability to make the dartboard on this shot, if I am a terrible
dartplayer. But this inference is merely defeasible — it is coherent to say things like:
(i) He is a terrible dartplayer, though I admit he was able to hit the dartboard on that shot.
Nonetheless, as is typical even of defeasible inferences, my hitting the board is generally some evi-
dence that I was able to do so; and so it is some evidence against the claim that I am terrible dartplayer.
Unless my audience has good independent information that I am a terrible dartplayer, my actually hit-
ting the dartboard should make them less confident of my claim. This I think gives a good account
of the pressure put on my claim by actual success: it tends to force me to give new evidence for my
claim.
16Willer (2021)’s system does predict the simultaneous failure of Success and the validity of Can’t-
entails-won’t. It does not however predict the validity of Past Success.
17Here and throughout I make the background assumption that, at LF, ‘can’ is really a sentential
operator, taking a sentence as argument; and not a raising modal with a more complicated syntax.
This is simply to aid presentation (and the proofs in the Appendix).
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No matter what worlds are accessible, this view cannot accommodate both the
invalidity of Success and the validity of Can’t-entails-won’t. Can’t-entails-won’t
is valid iff A is reflexive, i.e. A(w) always contains w. But reflexivity guarantees
Success is valid too. This is exactly because Can’t-entails-won’t is just the contra-
positive of Success.
Now turn to the second tension, that Past Success is valid while Success is not.
Most accounts are not explicit about the role of time in ability modals.18 But the
natural way of adding temporal sensitivity to these accounts does not resolve the
tension between Success and Past Success. Take an operator view of past tense,
where ⌜PAST φ⌝ is true at a time t iff φ was true at some previous time t:19
(22) JPAST φKw,t= 1 iff ∃t′ < t ∶ JφKw,t′= 1
Remember, the modal analysis says that ⌜S can φ⌝ is true at w iff there is some
accessible world where S φ’s. But one’s abilities are not fixed once and for all:
people lose abilities and gain new ones too. The natural fix is to say that what
worlds are accessible changes over time. ⌜S can φ⌝ is true at a world w and a time t
iff there is some world accessible from w at t where S φ’s. Where A(w)(t) is the
set of worlds accessible at w and at time t, we now have:
(23) Jcan(S φ)Kw,t= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ A(w)(t) ∶ JS φKw′,t= 1.
Now we can see why Past Success is invalid iff Success is. Suppose, on Mon-
day, I hit the dartboard even though I am not able to, invalidating Success. Then
on Tuesday it will be true that, on Monday, I hit the top of the dartboard; but it will
also be true on Tuesday that, on Monday, I wasn’t able to hit the top of the dart-
board, invalidating Past Success as well. The argument that Success is valid, if Past
Success is, proceeds the same way: a counterexample to Past Success at t will be a
counterexample to Success at some point earlier than t.
The modal view is just one account of abilities; but the problems it faces are
general. Before going on, it’s worth considering one more class of views, defended
by Brown (1988), Horty and Belnap (1995) and Horty (2001).20 Such views say
18An exception to this is Horty (2001). But that view does not escape the challenge here.
19The point goes through equally well on a referential theory of the past tense.
20A related view is the conditional analysis of Mandelkern et al. (2017), where ⌜S can φ⌝ is true just
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that ⌜S can φ⌝ is true iff there’s some proposition in the agent’s power to bring about
that entails S φ’s; I’ll call this the boxy view. More formally, where A(w) is a set
of accessible propositions at w, the boxy view says:
Boxy Analysis. Jcan(S φ)Kw= 1 iff ∃p ∈ A(w) ∶ ∀w′ ∈ p ∶ JS φKw′= 1.
This view does no better: Success, on this view, is just equivalent to Can’t-entails-
won’t; both are characterised by the condition that {w} ∈ A(w).21 And, for the
same reasons as on the modal analysis, the natural way of adding time to the analysis
validates Past Success iff it validates Success.
This point is worth dwelling on for a moment longer. The boxy analysis has
been proposed (at least in part) to specifically account for Kenny (1976)’s observa-
tion that ability does not distribute across disjunction. The fact that it fails demon-
strates that my puzzle here goes beyond Kenny’s: even accounts that do not predict
distribution over disjunction fail to account for my three data points.
2 The Path Forward: the Indeterminacy View
There is a tight connection between what we want and what we do not. What kind
of resources would allow us to pull these principles apart?
in case for some available action if S were to perform that action, S would φ; the relevant conditional
here is the Stalnakerian variably strict conditional, which obeys Conditional Excluded Middle.
To spell this out more formally, letA(w) the agent’s available actions at w. Write f(A,w) for the
closest world where A holds. Then the Mandelkern et al. semantics is as follows:
Jcan(S φ)Kw = 1 iff for some α ∈ A(w): f(S tries to α,w) ∈ JS φK
This analysis, while close to my own, faces the same problems as the views above. Success and
Can’t-entails-won’t are both characterised by the condition that the agent always tries to perfrom
some available action:
(i) For some α ∈ A(w), w ∈ S tries to α.
I show in Appendix A that this characterises Success in their framework; the reader can easily adapt
the proof to show that it also characterises Can’t-entails-won’t. Moreover, once times are added to
the analysis, Past Success is equivalent Success for just the same reasons as on the modal analysis:
a counterexample to Success at t is a counterexample to Past Success at some time later than t; and
vice versa.
21See Appendix A for the proof.
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Start with Can’t-entails-won’t and ∨-Success. Here we want to say that one
inference pattern, Success, is invalid, but its contrapositive, Can’t-entails-won’t, is
not. If we say sentences can be neither true nor false, but rather indeterminate, this
allows for exactly the structure we want. If entailment is truth-preservation, the
inference from φ to ψ can be invalid, because ψ can be indeterminate when φ is
true, even while the inference from ¬ψ to ¬φ is in fact valid.
To see this, focus on a toy case. Suppose we have three worlds w1, w2 and w3
and two sentences φ and ψ. Writing ‘#’ for indeterminacy, suppose that φ and ψ
have the values shown below:
w3w2w1
V (φ) = 0V (φ) = 1V (φ) = 1
V (ψ) = 0V (ψ) =#V (ψ) = 1
Assume entailment is truth-preservation. Then φ does not entail ψ: there is a world
where φ is true but ψ is not, namely w2; at w2 it is not true but indeterminate.
But ¬ψ does entail ¬φ: at every world where ¬φ is true, namely w3, ¬φ is also
true. This, I suggest, is exactly the situation with Success and Can’t-entails-won’t.
Can’t-entails-won’t always preserves truth; Success does not, because sometimes
its premise is true, while its conclusion is indeterminate.
Now take Past Success and Success. Reasoning according to Past Success, but
not Success, is good, I’ll suggest, because when success is in the past, it is settled.
Since Aristotle at least, it has been recognised that there is some sense in which the
future is open, but the past is settled. Suppose when I tossed a fair coin once it came
up heads and I am about to toss it again. The outcome of the first toss is settled:
the course of history so far determines that it came up heads. The outcome of the
second is unsettled: history does not settle how it will land, since it is fair.
But in what sense is the future open and the past settled? Perhaps outcomes
can be metaphysically indeterminate, as, for example, Barnes and Cameron (2011)
argue: perhaps all the facts up to now plus the laws of nature really do not settle
certain outcomes. But this is a controversial metaphysical position. I aim to be
more ecumenical. I take the outcome of the coin flip to be unsettled in the sense that
the coin could, in the everyday sense, come up heads or come up tails. Following
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Condoravdi (2002), I take this everyday sense of possibility to be what Kratzer
(1981, 1991) calls circumstantial possibility. It is plausibly understood as holding
fixed just some relevant subset of facts up until now. Perhaps the microlevel facts
and the laws settle what will happen with the coins, perhaps they don’t. But holding
fixed facts like, say, the coin is two sided and on average it comes up heads half the
time does leave open whether it will come up heads or not.
These notions have of course been studied together extensively in the literature
on ‘will’ and future contingents. So that is where I will look for inspiration for my
account of abilities.
3 Future Contingents andW
Future contingents have been argued to have three special properties. As we will
see, each property mirrors a property of ability. Our assessments of ‘will’-claims, it
has been argued, involve a kind of temporal asymmetry. Before the fact, the future
seems open and ‘will’-claims seem unsettled; but after the fact, we seem happy
to talk as if they were settled all along. ‘Will’ is also scopeless with respect to
negation: ⌜¬Will φ⌝ seems equivalent to ⌜Will ¬φ⌝ .
Here I introduce a modal operatorW that captures this behaviour. W is a se-
lection modal, in the sense of Cariani and Santorio (2018): ⌜Wφ⌝ says that φ is
true in the closest world to actuality. But crucially, on my theory, the closest world
leaves various facts unsettled. This ensures W has the right properties for giving
the semantics of ability modals.
3.1 Features of Future Contingents
Let’s first take the temporal asymmetry in assessing future contingents.
Recall Aristotle’s famous case of the sea battle. On Monday, it is not yet settled
whether there will be a battle or not on Tuesday: a capricious ruler decides by
flipping a fair coin this evening. I make the following prediction:
(24) There will be a sea battle on Tuesday.
There is a long tradition of thinking that because the future is unsettled, sentences
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like (24) must be indeterminate in truth-value.22 Things could go either way, de-
pending on how the coin lands. If the coin comes up heads, there will be a battle;
if not then not. But the outcome of the toss is not settled; and so whether there will
be a sea battle tomorrow is unsettled too.
Now suppose the sea battle does take place on Tuesday. When I look back on my
earlier prediction, what should I think? It seems I can say either of the following:
(25) There would in fact be a sea battle on Tuesday.
(26) I said there would be a sea battle on Tuesday; and indeed there would be.
‘Would’ is generally regarded to be the past tense of ‘will’.23 But then it is surprising
that we can say either of (25) or (26): if my assertion was indeterminate when I said
it, why do I now say that it was true?24
These are the first two properties I wantW to have. Where ◇φ says that φ is
circumstantially possible and ∇φ says that φ is indeterminate, we have:
Openness. ◇φ,◇¬φ↝ ∇Wφ
Past Settledness. PAST φ ↝ PAST Wφ
Before the fact, if φ and ¬φ are possible, then Wφ is indeterminate; but once φ
has happened, PAST Wφ is determinately true. (As we will see later on, this will
eventually allow me to validate Past Success without validating Success.)
The third feature is the way that ‘will’ interacts with negation. Usually, placing
a negation over or under a modal gives rise to very different meanings. Saying
something like
(27) You have to not be there when he arrives.
means something very different from
(28) You don’t have to be there when he arrives.
22See, among others, Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Lukasiewicz (1920), Lukasiewicz (1951).
23See Abusch (1997), Abusch (1998) and Condoravdi (2002).
24See MacFarlane (2003).
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This scoping behaviour is typical of modals. In general:
(29) ¬(MODAL φ)  MODAL ¬φ
‘Will’ does not give rise to any scope distinctions with respect to negation. Take
a predicate like ‘is absent’ that includes a negation as part of its meaning. Consider
the following example:
(30) I doubt that John will be present.
This says that I think it is not the case that John will be present. But it quite clearly
entails
(31) I think that John will be absent.
In general, saying that it is not the case that φ will happen just is to say that ¬φ will
happen.25 I aim then forW to be scopeless with respect to negation, as Cariani and
Santorio (2018) put it:
Scopelessness. ¬Wφ↭W¬φ
(As we’ll see later, Scopelessness will secure Can’t-entails-won’t.)
3.2 Combining Selection Modals with Indeterminacy
Following Cariani and Santorio (2018), I say that ⌜Wφ⌝ is true iff φ is true in the
closest world to the actual world.26
But plugging this into the standard way of thinking about worlds does not yield
indeterminacy. Worlds in possible worlds semantics are usually treated as complete
possible histories: when you give a world a proposition and time, it always tells
25This point has been recognised at least since Thomason (1970).
26An alternative starting point would be a ‘Peircian’ quantificational view of ‘will’, where
⌜Wφ⌝ says that φ is true in all possible histories compatible with the present. This has been explored
by, among others, Prior (1967) and Belnap et al. (2001) and in linguistics by Kaufmann (2005) and
Copley (2009). I do not opt for a Peircian view because using it in my semantics for ‘can’ has unwel-
come consequences. We validate a much stronger inference than Past Success, namely the inference
from ⌜PAST S φ⌝ to ⌜PAST S cannot not φ⌝. But this inference is clearly invalid.
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us that the proposition is either true or false there at that time. So if W selects a
complete possible history, then it does not introduce indeterminacy.27
Nevertheless, possible worlds semantics has the resources to represent a world
that is unsettled in various respects. As shown by Prior (1967), Thomason (1970)
and Thomason (1984), a world that is unsettled past a certain time can be repre-
sented using a set of worlds which agree in all (relevant) matters of fact up to that
time, but diverge afterwards; I’ll call such a set an unsettled world. In the sea bat-
tle case, we represent the earlier, indeterminate state of the world with a set of
worlds agreeing on all (relevant) matters of fact up until today and then diverging
on whether a sea battle occurs tomorrow. We can think of a proposition as being
true at an unsettled world iff it is true at all worlds in that set; as false iff it is false
at all worlds in that set; and indeterminate, otherwise
I combine the selection modal semantics with unsettled worlds. Say that the
actual unsettled world represents our world at the time of utterance, settling every-
thing up until that time. ⌜Wφ⌝ says that φ is true in the closest unsettled world to the
actual unsettled world. Crucially, the closest world to an unsettled world will usu-
ally be the actual unsettled world itself, and so variousW-claims to be themselves
indeterminate.
Before we go on, we should acknowledge an obvious question — is W the
semantics for ‘will’?28 I want to remain neutral here. All of the properties of myW
have defenders in the literature on ‘will’, but they are still controversial. Particularly
so for Openness: many deny that settledness plays any interesting role in the truth
of ‘will’ claims.29 (Indeed, the tradition of rejecting this principle is almost as old
as the tradition that embraces it.) This is why I have introduced W as a separate
operator: my core claim is that the kind of indeterminacy that has been attributed
by some to ‘will’ plays a crucial role in ability ascriptions; and not that ‘will’ itself
meansW .
27Cariani and Santorio are aware of this but prefer to keep indeterminacy in the postsemantics.
28Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me clarify my thoughts here.
29Note, however, that it is often accepted in natural language semantics that something like the open
future is involved in other constructions. In particular, it is often assumed that circumstantial modality
has the property that past and present propositions are either necessarily true or necessarily false;
while claims about the future may be both possibly true and possibly false. Condoravdi (2002) puts
this property to work in accounting for contrasts between the temporal orientation of circumstantial
and epistemic modals.
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If ‘will’ is not sensitive to settledness, then perhaps my use of unsettled worlds
and the indeterminacy they generate are sui generis. Or perhaps not. One source
of indeterminacy in natural language is the phenomenon of homogeneity presup-
positions. It was noted in Fodor (1970) that plurals appear to presuppose that their
domain is homogenous with respect to their arguments. Consider:
(32) The boys are in the yard.
(33) The boys are not in the yard.
Neither sentence is clearly true, when some but not all the boys are in the yard;
both receive truth-values only if the boys are homogenous with respect to whether
they are in the yard. Homogeneity has been explored for a range of constructions,
modals and conditionals in particular, in Schwarzschild (1993), von Fintel (1997),
Kriz (2015), Santorio (2018) and Goldstein (2019); and Copley (2009) proposes it
for ‘will’, but not in a selection modal framework.
The indeterminacy of W could be reduced to a homogeneity presupposition.
We might say thatW presupposes that the closest unsettled world is homogenous
with respect to the antecedent. My talk of a proposition being true or false at an
unsettled world would simply be a picturesque way of stating the homogeneity con-
straint; and the key logical features of ‘can’ would ultimately derive from homo-
geneity.
A different strategy would be to more thoroughly embrace the idea that proposi-
tions are evaluated for truth or falsity at entities coarser than worlds. My unsettled
worlds are very close to the possibilities from Humberstone (1981)’s possibility
semantics— just like possibilities, they are world-like entities that carry less infor-
mation than worlds do. (And, like on Humberstone’s approach, they are modelled as
sets of wholly determinate worlds.) The core idea of possibility semantics is that all
sentences are evaluable at possibilities, rather than worlds;30 and a key consequence
is that, since possibilities do not specify all the facts, sentences can be indetermi-
nate. Stating my semantics in the framework of possibility semantics would thus
30This is just one of a family of related approaches here. Structurally similar ideas are proposed
in the framework of data semantics from Veltman (1985) and its inquisitive semantic descendants,
explored in Ciardelli et al. (2018). Truth-maker semantics, as advocated by Fine (2017), also allow
for a similar kind of indeterminacy.
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reduce the indeterminacy I am interested in to the more general kind deriving from
possibilities. I will not offer here a formulation of my semantics in that framework;
but I am optimistic it can be done.
I won’t take a stand here on which of the three approaches, sui generis unsettled
worlds, a homogeneity presupposition, or possibility semantics, is most promising,
if ‘will’ does not meanW; I take all three to be live options. Instead I note that the
formal framework below is, in principle, compatible with all three.
3.3 The Formal Details
To state the lexical entry for W , let’s first say how unsettled worlds get into the
semantics and how we model closeness.
I add an unsettled world, I, to the index of the semantic evaluation function J⋅K.
I assume that the unsettled world is supplied to the semantics by context: we form
the unsettled world of the context Ic by taking the set of worlds that are duplicates
of the (determinate) context world up until the context time:
Unsettled World. Ic = {w ∣ w is identical to wc up until tc}
Now let’s think about how to model closeness. Following Stalnaker (1968),
I use a selection function to supply the closest worlds. A Stalnakerian selection
function s takes a world w and a proposition A and returns the closest world to w
where A is true. My selection functions take an unsettled world as input and can
also return an unsettled world as output: s(I,A) picks out the closest (possibly
unsettled) world to I which settles that A is true.
What if we want the selection function to give us the closest world to I sim-
pliciter? We simply let the other argument be the tautology ⊺. I say that ⊺ is supplied
by a modal base, a function f from a world and a time to a set of worlds.31 I assume
that f is supplied by the index and that f does not include any information by itself:
in general, f(w, t) = ⊺. To find the closest world simpliciter to the unsettled world
of the context, Ic, we find s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)).
I will make a structural assumption about closeness, which I call Overlap:32
31Cariani and Santorio also use a modal base, but do not assume it is empty.
32This is an analogue of the Strong Centering principle on Stalnaker selection functions, which
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Overlap. If A ∩B ≠ ∅, then s(A,B) = A ∩B.
Suppose we want the closest worlds to an unsettled world B where A happens and
that B contains some A-worlds. Overlap tells us that those closest worlds will be
the A-worlds in B.
Overlap guarantees that Ic is the closest world to itself. Since fc(wc, tc) is the
set of all worlds, s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) must be Ic. This allows us to ignore the modal
base when ‘will’ is unembedded or under past tense. (Why include it at all then?
Because we will use it in the semantics for conditionals: following Kratzer I will
assume that conditionals add the antecedent to the modal base.)
Now we can state the semantics. To see if ⌜Wφ⌝ is true, we find s(I, f(w, t)),
the closest world to the unsettled world where φ is true. If φ is true at s(I, f(w, t))
(i.e. true throughout I), ⌜Wφ⌝ is true; if φ is false at s(I, f(w, t)) (i.e. false
throughout I), ⌜Wφ⌝ is false; but if φ is neither true nor false at s(I, f(w, t)) (i.e.
is true at some worlds in I but false at others), ⌜Wφ⌝ is indeterminate.
Say that the value of JφK is determinate at a point just it is not indeterminate.
Then we can make this precise as follows:33
(34) a. JWφKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ JφKt,f,I or
(ii) s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ J¬φKt,f,I
b. If determinate, JWφKw,t,f,I = 1 iff s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ JφKt,f,I
Finally, some background assumptions. I continue to work with the operator
semantics for past tense:
says that w is always the closest world to itself.
33Note that, as stated,W actually includes no time shifting component. For our purposes here, it
won’t be necessary to add one. We are dealing throughout with specific ability attributions, where
the time is specifically built into the prejacent. So, for the relevant ‘will’ claims, an explicit (future)
time will also already be built into the prejacent.
Adding a time-shifting element to the semantics is somewhat delicate: if we simply add existential
quantification over future times in the closest world, we no longer validate Scopelessness. One way
to deal with this is to add explicit tense variables to W , so that ⌜Wt φ⌝ is true at t′ iff φ is true in
the closest world at time t; and, to get the future shifting effect, we could add a presupposition that t
must be in the future of whatever time ⌜Wt φ⌝ is evaluated at. But see Cariani (2019) also for another
approach.
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(22) JPAST φKw,t= 1 iff ∃t′ < t ∶ JφKw,t′= 1
I assume the standard three-valued semantics for negation:
(35) a. J¬φKw,t,f,I = 1 iff JφKw,t,f,I = 0
b. J¬φKw,t,f,I = 0 iff JφKw,t,f,I = 1.
c. J¬φKw,t,f,I =# iff JφKw,t,f,I =#.
I assume the standard Kaplanian definition of truth at a context:
Truth at a context. JφKc = JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic
And finally I assume entailment is preservation of truth at a context:
Diagonal validity. φ1, ..., φn c ψ iff whenever Jφ1Kc = ... = JφnKc = 1 then JψKc =
1.
3.4 Delivering Openness, Past Settledness and Asymmetry
This package delivers our three features:
Openness. ◇φ,◇¬φ↝ ∇Wφ
Past Settledness. PAST φ ↝ PAST Wφ
Scopelessness. ¬Wφ↭W¬φ
Let’s now see why at an informal level. (See Appendix B for the proofs.)
Openness holds because if it is unsettled whether φ will happen, then the ac-
tual unsettled world, the closest world to itself, does not settle whether φ happens.
Return to Monday in our sea battle case. At this point it is possible that there
will be a sea battle on Tuesday and possible that there won’t. So the actual un-
settled world, IcMonday , does not settle whether there is a sea battle the next day.
Of course, IcMonday is the closest unsettled world to itself. So the closest unsettled
world doesn’t settle whether there will be a sea battle on Tuesday. This means (24)
below is indeterminate:
(24) W(There is a sea battle on Tuesday)
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Past Settledness holds because, once φ becomes settled, the actual unsettled
world, again the closest world to itself, settles φ. Move forward to Tuesday in the
sea battle case. Now the sentence
(36) There was a sea battle on Tuesday.
is true in the context of utterance. That means the unsettled world of the context we
now occupy, IcTuesday , settles that there was a sea battle on Monday. Now consider
whether the following is true:
(25) PAST W(There is a sea battle on Tuesday).
Take some arbitrary time t′ in the past : what is the closest world to IcTuesday at t′?
More precisely, what is s(IcTuesday , fc(wc, t′))? Since fc(wc, t′) is just the set of
all worlds, by Overlap, it must be Ic itself. But, since (36) is true, we know that
IcTuesday settles that there was a sea battle. So there’s some past time t′ when the
closest world to IcTuesday settled that there is a sea battle on Tuesday. This suffices
to make (25) true.
Finally, Scopelessness is valid because, if the actual unsettled world is determi-
nately not one where φ holds, then it is one where ¬φ is determinately true.
Suppose the following is true:
(37) ¬W(I eat another cookie).
This means that the following sentence is false:
(38) W(I eat another cookie)
(38) is false iff the closest world to the unsettled world of the context is one where
I do not eat another cookie. In other worlds, Ic settles that I do not eat another
cookie. But this is exactly what it takes for the sentence:
(39) W¬(I eat another cookie)
to be true. So if ⌜¬Wφ⌝ is true, then so is ⌜W¬φ⌝ .
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4 A New Conditional Analysis
Now that we have introduced W , I can give my semantics for abilities. On my
theory, ⌜S can φ⌝ is true iff, for some available action α, if S tries to α thenW(S
φ’s).34 In this section I lay out the view on an intuitive level; in the next, I provide
all the formal details.
Stating my semantics in terms ofW allows us to capture the control intuition.
Consider:
(6) I can hit the bullseye on this throw.
Assume the actions available to me are a set of tryings, a set of things I try to do.
For (6) to be true, there must be some action available to me that settles that I hit
the bullseye, in the closest unsettled world where I perform it. But it is hard for
an unsettled world to settle that I hit the bullseye: all the worlds in it must agree
that I hit the bullseye. This is the sense in which hitting the bullseye must be in my
control.35
But two other components must be explained, before we fully understand the
analysis.When is an action is available, in my sense? We don’t need a full account
to settle questions about the logic of ‘can’, but here are some general constraints. I
think of an agent’s available actions as their options.36 And, for simplicity at least,
we can typically think of options as a set of tryings:37 for example, in Unreliable
Dartboard my available options might be trying to hit the top and trying to hit the
bottom. This allows us to move the notion of trying out of the semantics and into the
pragmatics: going forward I simply say that ⌜S can φ⌝ is true iff, for some available
action α, if S does α, thenW(S φ’s); the context of utterance determines whether
34As mentioned, this semantics builds on the account of Mandelkern et al. (2017). That view in
turn builds on the conditional semantics of Lehrer (1976), Cross (1986) and Thomason (2005).
35My explanation of the control intuition is close in spirit to the stit analysis of Horty and Belnap
(1995) and Horty (2001); however, as we will see, it interacts very differently with negation and tense.
36One might worry that this is circular: if φ is an option for you doesn’t that entail you are able
to φ? This would indeed be a worry if we were trying to provide a reductive analysis of abilities.
But this is not our project: we are rather trying to say enough about ability attributions to predict
what inference patterns involving abilities are valid. (Although the approach sketched in footnote 27
may provide the starting point for a reductive analysis.) For precedents of this kind of attitude, see
Stalnaker (1968) on conditionals and Williamson (2000) on the logic of knowledge.
37Hedden (2012, 2015), for instance, endorses a view like this for independent reasons.
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the available actions are tryings and what tryings they may be.38
Second, though we know when ⌜S can φ⌝ is true, we do not yet know when it is
false. When it is not the case that some action settles that S φ’s, the theory says that
⌜S can φ⌝ is not true, that is, either false or indeterminate. But there are two ways
for this to happen: it could be that every action settles that S does not φ; or it could
be that some actions do not settle whether or not S φ’s. And we do not yet know
what particular value the ability claim gets in each situation. ⌜S can φ⌝ can fail to
be true in two ways: it could be false or indeterminate.
To better appreciate this point, take again:
(6) I can hit the bullseye on this throw.
Consider this first as said by Alice, an expert dartplayer who has mastered an un-
spectacular shot that always yields a bullseye and is learning some trick shots which
are less reliable. For her some action settles that it is determinately true that Alice
will hit the bullseye; so (6) is true as said by Alice. But now consider two other,
less expert players. Billy knows how to perform some shots which will definitely
lead him not to hit the bullseye; but none of his remaining shots settle whether he
hits the bullseye. And Carol is so hopeless that she cannot even hit the board: every
throw open to her settles that her dart misses the board entirely. While it cannot be
true, the view so far does not tell us whether (6) is false or indeterminate, when said
by Billy or Carol.
38Moving tryings out of the semantics also helps solve two problems for the traditional formulation
of the conditional analysis. Firstly, on the standard formulation, the ability to try is predicted to be
trivial. If someone tries to φ, then, trivially, they try to φ. But trying is not trivial: comatose patients,
for instance, arguably cannot try to get up, open their eyes or indeed do anything. Secondly, trying
creates problems when we ascribe abilities to non-agential objects. We can say, truly, that a flower
can follow the sun, that an elevator can carry 300 pounds or that a rock can tip the balance. In none
of these cases are we considering what would happen if such objects tried to do something.
My version of the conditional analysis, which does not mention the notion of trying in the semantics,
has the resources to avoid these objections. We can generalise the account by saying ‘can’ quantifies
over answers to some salient question. When the question is What option will S choose?, then ‘can’
quantifies over the available actions. But in other cases, we will get new and improved predictions.
For the comatose patient, the question might be What will happen to the patient?; and presumably any
answer to that question (consistent with the background facts) will entail, for instance, that the patient
does not try to open their eyes. For inanimate objects, the question could concern what happens to
the object: questions like Will the rock be placed on the scale? or Will the flower be planted outside?
yield plausible predictions for those cases.
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I give a Strong Kleene theory of how indeterminacy projects here: whenever no
action settles that S does φ and some action makes it indeterminate whether S φ’s,
then ⌜S can φ⌝ is indeterminate. Return to (6) as said by Alice. Intuitively, it does
not matter that some other actions leave it unsettled that she will hit the bullseye:
there is a surefire way for her to hit the bullseye, so the existential claim should be
true. (6) should come out false as said by Carol: all actions determinately lead her
to not hit the bullseye. And, as said by Billy, I say (6) is indeterminate: no action
determines he will hit the bullseye; but some actions fail to determine whether he
will either way. As I spell out in the next section, this is exactly what the Strong
Kleene approach predicts: ⌜S can φ⌝ is indeterminate just in case no action settles
that S φ’s and some action leaves it unsettled whether S φ’s.
So that is the view: ⌜S can φ⌝ says that, for some available action, the closest
world where that action is performed settles that S φ’s; available actions are our
options, construed as a set of tryings; and it is determinate when either some action
settles that S φ’s or every action settles that S ¬φ’s.
5 The Formal Details
I work up to the full semantic entry for ⌜S can φ⌝ in two steps. First, I focus on the
truth-conditions for ‘can’, formalising the notion of an available action and clari-
fying the conditional element of ‘can’. Then I spell out more precisely the Strong
Kleene determinacy conditions.
5.1 The Semantics
To simplify, propositions about actions stand in for actions. I represent the avail-
able actions using a function A that takes a world and a time and yields a set of
propositions. A(w, t) is the set of actions available to the subject at w and t.
I assume that the set of available actions represents a set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive options for the agent: in every circumstantially accessible world, the
agent performs exactly one of the available actions. Thinking of actions as proposi-
tions allows us to formulate this idea in a natural way. The set of available actions is
a partition of the circumstantially possible worlds: every circumstantially accessi-
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ble world is a member of exactly one proposition inA(w, t) (andA(w, t) does not
contain the empty set).39 Call this assumption Partitionality.40 Importantly, since
the actual world is always circumstantially accessible to itself, the actual world is
always a member of at least one available action.
To fully spell out my conditional analysis, we need to be clear on how the condi-
tional works. I give it a restrictor semantics, a la Kratzer (1981, 2012): a conditional
restricts the domain for a modal in the consequent to worlds where the antecedent
is true.41 More precisely, where fA is the function such that fA(w) = f(w) ∩ A,
the conditional has the following truth-conditions.
(40) Jif φ, ψKw,t,f,I= 1 iff JψKw,t,fJφK
t,f,I
,I= 1
When W is embedded in the consequent, a restrictor conditional restricts the
modal base argument to the selection function. We said that ⌜Wφ⌝ is true iff the
closest (possibly indeterminate) world to the actual unsettled world is one where φ
is true. ⌜if φ,Wψ⌝ is true iff the closest world to the actual unsettled world where
φ is true is one where ψ is true. More precisely:
(41) Jif φ,WψKw,t,f,I= 1 iff JWψKw,t,fJφK
t,f,I
,I= 1
iff s(I, f JφKt,f,I(w, t)) ⊆ JψKt,fJφK
t,f,I
,I= 1
We can now state precisely my truth-conditions from §4. The rough idea was
that ⌜S can φ⌝ is true iff for some action, in the closest world where S does that
action, S φ’s. This is spelled out as follows:
(42) JS can φKw,t,f,I= 1 iff for some α ∈ A(w, t): JW(S φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I= 1
i.e. iff for some α ∈ A(w, t): s(I, fα(w, t)) ⊆ JS φ’sKt,fα,I= 1
39This is a standard move in the literature in deontic modals. See for instance Cariani (2013).
40This condition can actually be weakened to the following:
Sub-partitionality. There is some subsetA′ ofA(w, t) s.t. A′ partitions the circumstantially
possible worlds at w, t (and A(w, t) does not contain the empty set).
This weaker assumption suffices to capture the validities and invalidities I want; but it has the added
advantage of invalidating the inference from ⌜Wφ⌝ to ⌜cannot ¬φ⌝ . For simplicity, I will continue to
take Partionality as my official assumption. Thanks to Annina Loets for discussion here.
41Kratzer assumes bare conditionals involve a tacit epistemic ‘must’ in the consequent.
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5.2 Determinacy Conditions
On a Strong Kleene approach to disjunction, ⌜φ or ψ⌝ is determinate when we have
enough information to determine a unique truth-value using the classical truth-table
for ‘or’. If at least one of φ andψ is true, ⌜φ orψ⌝ is true; if both are false, ⌜φ orψ⌝ is
false; in all remaining cases it is indeterminate. This idea carries over to existential
quantifiers: an existentially quantified sentence is true if it has a true instance; it is
false if it has only false instances; and indeterminate otherwise.
Now apply this to ‘can’. I say that ⌜S can φ⌝ is true when, for some available
α, ⌜If S α’s,W(S φ’s)⌝ is true; ⌜S can φ⌝ is false when, for every available α, ⌜If S
α’s,W(S φ’s)⌝ is false; and is indeterminate, otherwise. Spelled out precisely:
(43) JS can φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
a. there is some α ∈ A(w, t) such that JW(S φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I = 1;
b. or for all α ∈ A(w, t), JW(S φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I = 0.
Combine this with the truth-conditions and we have full statement of the view:
(44) a. JS can φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is some α ∈ A(w, t) such that JW(S φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I = 1;
(ii) or for all α ∈ A(w, t), JW(S φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I = 0.
b. If determinate, JS can φKw,t,f,I = 1 iff for some α ∈ A(w, t) ∶ JW(S
φ’s)Kw,t,fα,I = 1
i.e. iff for some α ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t) ∩ α) ⊆ JS φ’sKt,fα,I
6 Predictions
I distilled the tension involving Success into three data points about ability modals:
Validity of Past Success. PAST (S φ) ↝ PAST (S can φ)
Validity of Can’t-entails-won’t. ¬(S can φ) ↝ ¬(S φ)
Invalidity of ∨- Success. S φ ∨ S ψ   S can φ ∨ S can ψ
My semantics delivers each of these predictions: it explains why Success is so close
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to being valid, despite having counterexamples.
6.1 Failure of ∨-Success
∨- Success fails on my theory because S may end up φ-ing even though no available
action settles whether S φ’s.
Return to Unreliable Dartboard. What are the available actions? A natural
choice is I try to hit the top and I try to hit the bottom. And since I am a bad
dartplayer, neither settles what happens. I may get lucky: in some worlds I succeed
in doing what I try to do. But I also may not: in some worlds I do exactly the
opposite of what I try.
Let’s spell this out a little more precisely. Assume there are just four worlds,
one for each of these situations; call them wtry T ∧ hit B,wtry B ∧ hit T,wtry T ∧ hit T and
wtry B ∧ hit B. These are all and only the scenarios compatible my current situation
and so the unsettled world of the context Ic contains just these four worlds:
(45) Ic = {wtry T ∧ hit B,wtry B ∧ hit T,wtry T ∧ hit T,wtry B ∧ hit B}
The closest unsettled world where I try to hit the top is the set {wtry T ∧ hit B,wtry T ∧ hit T}.
Crucially, this world does not settle whether I hit the top or the bottom: it leaves both
open. The closest world where I try to hit the bottom is {wtry B ∧ hit T,wtry B ∧ hit B}
and this also leaves the outcome unsettled.
So, given our semantics forW and for the conditional, for both available actions
α, it is indeterminate whether I will hit the top, if I perform α and indeterminate
whether I will hit the bottom, if I perform α. Given Strong Kleene projection, both
of the following must be indeterminate:
(46) I can hit the top of the dartboard on this throw.
(47) I can hit the bottom of the dartboard on this throw.
In general, when both disjuncts of a disjunction are indeterminate, then so is the
whole disjunction. So the conclusion of our inference,
(48) I can hit the top of the dartboard on this throw or I can hit the bottom of
the dartboard on this throw.
29
is indeterminate and Unreliable Dartboard is a counterexample to Success: I am
going to either hit the top or the bottom of the dartboard; but it is indeterminate
whether I can hit the top and whether I can hit the bottom.
In fact, as I show in the Appendix, examples like these are the only kinds of
cases where Success fails: if the premise of Success is true, the conclusion is at
worst indeterminate — never false. In other words, in the terminology of von Fintel
(1999), Success is Strawson-valid: whenever the premise of Success is true and the
conclusion is determinate, then the conclusion is true.
6.2 Past Success
I will give the flavour of why Past Success holds by showing how the inference goes
through in Unreliable Dartboard.
Imagine that as a matter of fact the following is now true in our context:
(49) I hit the top of the dartboard a few moments ago.
This means that it is settled whether I hit the dartboard: the unsettled world of the
context, Ic, contains only worlds where I hit the dartboard a few moments ago.
Trying to hit the top and trying to hit the bottom were the actions available to
me, so I must have done one of the two. Suppose as a matter of fact I tried to hit
the top. So the unsettled world of the context also settles that I tried to hit the top a
few moments ago.
Now, consider:
(50) I was able to hit the top of the dartboard a few moments ago.
To see if this is true, we need to ask, was there some α available to me such that in
the closest world where I performed it, it is settled that I hit the top?
The answer to this question is yes. Consider the actual unsettled world of our
present context. There just a few moments ago, at t′ say, I performed an available
action — I tried to hit the top. So Ic,the actual unsettled world, is s(Ic, fc(wc, t′)),
the closest unsettled world to Ic at t′ where I tried to hit the top. And we already
know that there it is settled that I did in fact hit the top. So trying to hit the top
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witnesses the truth of (50): the actual unsettled world is the closest world where I
perform it; and we know that I actually did hit the top.
6.3 Can’t-entails-won’t
Can’t-entails-won’t is valid because ⌜S cannot φ⌝ says that for all available actions
α, the closest world where S α’s settles that S does not φ. Since some available
action must always be performed, this ensures that S φ’s.
Let’s start by seeing why ⌜S cannot φ⌝ means what it does on my view. Recall
the three-valued account of negation: ⌜¬φ⌝ is true when φ is false; is false when
φ is true; and is indeterminate when φ is too. So ⌜S cannot φ⌝ is true iff ⌜S can
φ⌝ is false; is false when ⌜S can φ⌝ is true; and is otherwise indeterminate. Given
my theory, this means that ⌜S cannot φ⌝ is true when every available action settles
that S does not φ; is false when some available action settles that S does φ; and is
otherwise indeterminate.
To see this better, consider:
(51) I cannot hit the bullseye.
The precise truth-value of this claim depends on the truth-value of the claim:
(52) I can hit the bullseye.
On my theory, (52) is true iff, for some available action α, the closest world where
I perform α settles that I hit the bullseye. (52) is false iff, for every available α,
the closest world where I perform α is one where I do not hit the bullseye. In the
remaining cases, (52) is indeterminate. This means that (51) is true iff, for every
available α, the closest world where I perform α is one where where I do not hit the
bullseye.
It is now easy to see why Can’t-entails-won’t holds. If (51) is true, then, for all
available actions, the closest unsettled world where I do that action is one where I
do not hit the bullseye. So every action settles that I do not hit the bullseye. Now
remember that the available actions are my options: no matter how things go, I will
perform exactly one of the available actions. So if (51) is true, then, no matter how
things go, no matter what I action I perform, I end up not hitting the bullseye. But
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then the actual indeterminate world must already settle that I will not the bullseye
and so it must be true that I will not hit the bullseye. More generally, when ⌜S
cannot φ⌝ is true, every available action ensures that S does not φ. And since S
always performs an available action, it follows that S does not φ.
7 The Broader Picture
We have shown how to reconcile our three data points. Before concluding, I want
to reflect on why these data are so central to an account of ability; and then examine
how the account treats a battery of other standard data involving ability modals.
In the Introduction, I noted that ability modals are governed by the control in-
tuition: saying, for instance, that you can hit a home run communicates that doing
so is in your control. This is one of the central features of ability modals. It dis-
tinguishes them from their closest cousins, the pure circumstantial or metaphysical
modals, which do not require any notion of control. For example in Unreliable
Dartboard, I can say:
(53) I could hit the dartboard.
(54) I might hit the dartboard.
These circumstantial modal readings are unquestionably true, even though hitting
the dartboard is not in my control. For particularly extreme cases, we might look to
lotteries. Even when the odds are stacked against me, I am surely entitled to say:
(55) I could win!
But the claims:
(56) I can win.
(57) I am able to win.
strike me as bizarre, on their most natural reading where the modal picks out ability.
So control is central to ability. My puzzle is about how to make sense of con-
trol; my data show that it is much harder than one might have thought. Whatever
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control amounts to, one might have thought that at a minimum success does not
establish control. I have argued this is ultimately correct, but hard to capture. Any
analysis of control must also validate Past Success and Can’t-entails-won’t; given
their interconnections, this is hard to do while also invalidating Success. So I take
solving my puzzle to be a very important empirical advantage of the account: my
notion of control that is faithful to the motivating intuitions and makes sense of Past
Success and Can’t-entails-won’t.
But my empirical coverage is not limited to the central puzzle.42 Firstly, ac-
counting for this puzzle allows me to capture the other distinctive logical features
of ability modals. Mandelkern et al. (2017) stress that a plausible account of ability
modals must predict a plausible meaning for the dual, cannot not. Consider:
(58) I cannot not have another cigarette.
Mandelkern et al. (2017) observe that cannot not is strong because it expresses com-
pulsion — (58) says that I will have a cigarette no matter what. This is surprising,
given that ‘can’ is also in a certain sense strong. Many accounts designed to capture
this strength, like the boxy view, wrongly predict the dual is weak.43
My account gives the dual a plausible meaning, in line with that of Mandelkern
et al. (2017). Given my entries for ‘can’ and ‘not’, we can derive the following entry
for ‘cannot not’:
(59) a. Jcannot not φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is some α ∈ A(w, t) such that JW¬φKw,t,fα,I = 1;
(ii) or for all α ∈ A(w, t), JW¬φKw,t,fα,I,A = 0.
b. If determinate, JcannotφKw,t,f,I = 1 iff for allα ∈ A(w, t) ∶ JW¬φKt,fα,I ≠
1
i.e. iff for all α ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t) ∩ α) ⊈ J¬φKt,fα,I
i.e., given the determinacy conditions, iff for allα ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t)∩
α) ⊆ JφKt,f
α,I
Focus on the truth-conditions here: ⌜S cannot φ⌝ is true iff S will φ, no matter
42Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to consider a wider range of data.
43See Mandelkern et al. (2017) for these arguments.
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what action they take. This is an appropriate meaning for a sentence like (58). But
furthermore, since I deliver Can’t-entails-won’t, my view has the advantage that it
predicts the dual is factive: ⌜cannot not φ⌝ entails φ.44
Unsurprisingly, I also account for Kenny’s observation that ability does not dis-
tribute across disjunction. That is, the following principle fails:
(60) S can (φ ∨ ψ)  S can φ ∨ S can ψ
In Unreliable Dartboard, if I try to hit the dartboard, I will; so some action avail-
able to me, namely trying to hit the dartboard, ensures I either hit the top or bottom
of the dartboard, giving us:45
(61) I can hit the dartboard.
But as we have already seen, I predict that it is not true that:46
(10) I can hit the top of the dartboard or I can hit the bottom of the dartboard.
I also account for an important non-logical feature of ability claims, their per-
vasive context-sensitivity. My account ties ability to circumstantial possibility. The
available actions, whatever they are, must partition the circumstantial possibilities.
44For the reasons discussed in footnote 20, Mandelkern et al. (2017) delivers this prediction only
if it validates Success.
45To control for free choice effects, I do not formulate (61) with an overt disjunction.
46On the approach of Mandelkern et al. (2017), specific ability does distribute across disjunction.
However, they claim that, since their account supervaluates over admissible selection functions, nei-
ther of the disjuncts of (10) is determinately true and that they thereby capture something like Kenny’s
intuition. This is not accurate: for one of the disjuncts to fail it must also be that the agent does not
try to perform any available action.
To see why, first note that any admissible selection function for their conditional obeys Strong
Centering: the closest A-world to w is w itself, if A holds at w. Now in cases like Unreliable
Dartboard, I will either hit the top or the bottom. Suppose I do try to do some available action α. If
I hit the top, then by Strong Centering, the closest world where I try to perform α on every admissible
selection function is the actual world where I hit the top; if I hit the bottom, by the same reasoning,
the closest world where I perform α on every admissible selection function is the actual world where
I hit the top. In either case, either ⌜I can hit the top⌝ is true on every admissible selection function or
⌜I can hit the bottom⌝ is.
It is not particularly plausible in this situation that I do not try to perform an available action here.
But moreover, as we saw in footnote 20, maintaining that no available action is attempted means that
Past Success and Can’t-entails-won’t fail. So I think my account, which says both disjuncts and the
disjunction are indeterminate, better captures Kenny’s data.
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And what you are able to do, on my account, is in part determined by the available
actions. Since the circumstantial possibilities are a matter of the context, so too is
what one’s abilities are.
Take the example of Alice, an expert in French cooking. We might say of her:
(62) Alice can make ratatouille.
By this we mean she has the requisite know how and skill. But suppose we lack the
ingredients for ratatouille. Now we can also say:
(63) Alice can’t make ratatouille; she doesn’t have the ingredients.
This context-sensitivity seems to track the context-sensitivity of circumstantial pos-
sibility. If we are not attending to what ingredients are on hand and you ask what
dishes Alice knows how to make, I could say:
(64) Alice could make ratatouille (or bouillabaisse or beef bourguignon...).
But ask instead what we should make for dinner tonight and (64) sounds false.
My account predicts this. When something is circumstantially impossible, it is
inconsistent with the available actions. So when we hear the true reading of (62),
we must be in a context where (64) is true and ratatouille-making is a circumstantial
possibility. When instead we are in the context where (64) is false, then (62) is false
and instead (63) is true. The contextual variation in what counts as circumstantially
possible produces variation in what we count as being able to do.
This kind of context-sensitivity also helps deal with some apparent counterex-
amples to my analysis of control.47 One might think that my analysis of control
makes it too strong. I might tell my partner:
(65) I can pick you up from work.
But of course, it is possible my car might break down, in which case I would not.
This does not seem to undermine my claim in (65), especially if I go on to success-
fully drive my partner home. But my analysis might seem to say it does — if it’s
47Thanks to Ginger Schultheis for discussion here.
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possible the car might break down, then no action will determinately lead to me
picking up my partner.
Of course the solution is that, in normal contexts, we hold fixed that the car will
not break down. Notice that I could equally comfortably have said:
(66) I will pick you up from work.
This would certainly be in tension with the possibility of a breakdown, if that was
indeed a possibility.48 I cannot say things like:
(67) The car could break down, but I will pick you up from work.
The natural conclusion here is that we hold fixed the fact that the car will not break
down and so it is not circumstantially possible in most cases. Once that is granted,
(65) poses no problem to my account.
Finally, this tie to circumstantial possibility equips me to account for some more
traditional counterexamples to conditional analyses of ability. Consider the case of
Larry, from Lehrer (1968), who has a pathological fear of blood-red candy. Were
he offered a bowl, he could not be induced to take any. We might readily say of
him:
(68) He is not able to take a candy.
As Lehrer notes, Larry could easily take a candy if he tried; but it is his inability to
even try that accounts for his inability to take a candy.
Nonetheless, I correctly predict (68) is false. It is also circumstantially impossi-
ble for Larry to take a candy, on at least one resolution of circumstantial possibility.
Consider:
(69) Larry could take a candy.
The most prominent reading is straightforwardly false — the circumstances deter-
mine that he won’t take one. Since on my view the available actions partition the
circumstantial possibilities, all will entail he does not take a candy.49
48I say in tension, as the exact nature of the tension depends exactly on one’s views about ‘will’.
49Note that I get the further desirable prediction that he cannot even try.
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Circumstantial possibility is not the only source of context-sensitivity on my
account. How to partition circumstantial worlds into actions is itself a context-
sensitive matter, as Cariani (2013) and Mandelkern et al. (2017) among others have
argued. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that many existing examples of the context-
sensitivity of ability can, on my view, be traced to an existing form of context-
sensitivity that is relatively well understood.
8 Conclusion
We started with a dilemma. There is a compelling case for Success: Past Success
is valid and so is Can’t-entails-won’t; and both are extremely close to Success. But
there are also compelling counterexamples to ∨-Success and hence to Success itself.
How can we enjoy the virtues of Success without being stuck with its vices too?
I stated my theory in terms ofW-conditionals — on my semantics ⌜S canφ⌝ says
that, for some available action α, if S α’s,W(S φ’s) — and showed how it recon-
ciled all three properties. Following a venerable tradition,W requires settledness:
⌜Wφ⌝ is true only when φ is settled; and is false only when ⌜¬φ⌝ is settled. But past
W claims require mere past truth, not past settledness. My view of abilities inherits
similar properties. ⌜S can φ⌝ requires that some action settles that S φ’s. Even if
S goes on to φ, this does not mean it is now settled; and so my account invalidates
∨-Success. But, once S does φ, past truth suffices to establish past ability, and so I
validate Past Success. Finally, ⌜S cannot φ⌝ requires every available action to settle
that S does not φ and so entails S does not φ, giving us Can’t-entails-won’t.
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A Proofs of Claims in §1.3
We first prove the following claim about the Boxy analysis:
Fact 1. Success is valid on the Boxy analysis just in case {w} ∈ A(w).
Proof. ⇒∶ Suppose for some w {w} ∉ A(w). We construct a countermodel by
letting JpK = {w}. Now we have JpKw = 1, by our choice of evaluation function;
but JCan pKw = 0, since there is no proposition in A(w) that entails p.
⇐∶ Suppose w ∈ A(w). Now suppose JφKw = 1. We can see some element of
A(w) entails φ, namely {w}. So JCan φKw = 1.
Moreover, the reader can easily adapt the above proof to show the same condition
characterises Can’t-entails-won’t.
Next we prove the following claim about the analysis of Mandelkern et al.
(2016):
Fact 2. Success is valid on the Mandelkern et al. analysis just in case w ∈ S tries to
α, for some α ∈ A(w).
Before proving this, it is important to recall that Stalnakerian selection functions
obey the following conditions:
Minimality. f(A,w) ∈ A, when A ≠ ∅.
Strong Centering. f(A,w) = w, when w ∈ A.
Proof. ⇒∶ Suppose that for no α ∈ A(w) w ∈ S tries to α. From Minimality,
it follows that, for all α ∈ A(w), w ≠ f(S tries to α,w). We now construct a
counterexample to Success. We let JpK = {w}. Then JpKw = 1. But since for all for
all α ∈ A(w), f(S tries to α,w) ∉ {w}, JCan pKw = 0.
⇐∶ Suppose w ∈ S tries to α, for some α ∈ A(w). Now suppose JφKw = 1. From
Strong Centering, we can see that f(S tries to α,w) = w. Since w ∈ JφK, it follows
that JCan φKw = 1.
Again, the reader can easily adapt the above proof to show the same condition char-
acterises Can’t-entails-won’t.
B Proofs of Main Results forW and Can
Our language L is the set of sentences generated by the following grammar:
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φ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬φ ∣ φ ∨ ψ ∣Wφ ∣ can φ ∣ PAST φ ∣ ◇φ ∣ ∇φ
Say that φ is non-modal iff it contains no instances ofW or ‘can’.
J⋅K, our semantic evaluation function, takes a (determinate) world w, a time t, a
modal base f and an indeterminate world (i.e. a set of worlds) I to a truth-value.
Here are the relevant semantic entries:
(70) a. J¬φKw,t,f,I = 1 iff JφKw,t,f,I = 0
b. J¬φKw,t,f,I = 0 iff JφKw,t,f,I = 1.
c. J¬φKw,t,f,I =# iff JφKw,t,f,I =#.
(71) Jφ ∨ ψKw,t,f,I =
a. 1, if either JφKw,t,f,I = 1 or JψKw,t,f,I = 1
b. 0, if JφKw,t,f,I = JψKw,t,f,I = 0
c. #, otherwise
(72) a. JWφKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ JφKt,f,I or
(ii) s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ J¬φKt,f,I
b. If determinate, JWφKw,t,f,I = 1 iff s(I, f(w, t)) ⊆ JφKt,f,I
(73) a. Jcan φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is some α ∈ A(w, t) such that JWφKw,t,fα,I = 1;
(ii) or for all α ∈ A(w, t), JWφKw,t,fα,I = 0.
b. If determinate, JcanφKw,t,f,I = 1 iff for someα ∈ A(w, t) ∶ JWφKt,fα,I, =
1
i.e. iff for some α ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t) ∩ α) ⊆ JφKt,fα,I
(74) a. JPAST φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is some t′ < t such that JφKw,t′,I=1
(ii) for all t′ < t, JφKw,t′,f,I= 0
b. If determinate, JPAST φKw,t,f,I= 1 iff for some t′ < t ∶ JφKw,t′,f,I= 1
(75) a. J◇ φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is somew′ ∈ C(w, t), the circumstantially accessible worlds
at w and t, such that JφKw′,t,f,I= 1
(ii) for all w′ ∈ C(w, t) JφKw′,t,f,I= 0
b. If determinate, J◇ φKw,t,f,I= 1 iff for somew′ ∈ C(w, t): JφKw′,t,f,I=
1
(76) J∇φKw,t,f,I = 1, if JφKw,t,f,I =#;
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J∇φKw,t,f,I = 0, otherwise.
Note that from these assumptions we can derive the following entry for ‘cannot’:
(77) a. Jcannot φKw,t,f,I is determinate only if either
(i) there is some α ∈ A(w, t) such that JWφKw,t,fα,I = 1;
(ii) or for all α ∈ A(w, t), JWφKw,t,fα,I,A = 0.
b. If determinate, JcannotφKw,t,f,I = 1 iff for allα ∈ A(w, t) ∶ JWφKt,fα,I ≠
1
i.e. iff for all α ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t) ∩ α) ⊈ JφKt,fα,I
i.e., given the determinacy conditions, iff for allα ∈ A(w, t) ∶ s(I, f(w, t)∩
α) ⊆ J¬φKt,f
α,I
Here are the various semantic assumptions I make:
Partitionality. A(w, t) is a partition of C(w, t), the circumstantially accessible
worlds at w and t.
Circumstantial. C(w, t) = {w′ ∶ for all non-modalφ, if t′ < t, JφKw,t′,f,I = JφKw′,t′,f,I}
Overlap. If A ∩B ≠ ∅, then s(A,B) = A ∩B.
I assume the usual Kaplanian notion of truth at a context:
Truth at a context. JφKc = JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic
I make the following assumptions about the postsemantics:
Modal Bases. fc(w, t) =W
Unsettled World. Ic = C(wc, tc)
Action Time. If t < tc, then if α ∈ A(wc, t) and wc ∈ α then Ic ⊆ α.
This last assumption ensures that if an action available in the past was performed,
it is now settled that it was performed. I assume the standard Kaplanian story for
the postsemantics of the remaining indices.
Finally, our notions of validity:
Validity. φ1, ..., φn ψ iff whenever Jφ1Kw,t,f,I = ... = JφnKw,t,f,I = 1 then
JψKw,t,f,I = 1.
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Diagonal validity. φ1, ..., φn c ψ iff whenever Jφ1Kc = ... = JφnKc = 1 then JψKc =
1.
Strawson-validity. φ1, ..., φn
Str
ψ iff when Jφ1Kw,t,f,I = ... = JφnKw,t,f,I = 1 and
JψKw,t,f,I is determinate, then JψKw,t,f,I = 1.
Diagonal Strawson-validity. φ1, ..., φn c
Str
ψ iff when Jφ1Kc = ... = JφnKc = 1 and
JψKc is determinate, then JψKc = 1.
We now prove that the various results in the text:
Fact 1. ◇φ, ◇¬φ c ∇(Wφ)
Proof. Suppose J◇φKc = J◇¬φKc = 1. ThenC(wc, tc) ⊈ JφKtc,fc,Ic andC(wc, tc) ⊈
J¬φKtc,fc,Ic . By Unsettled World, Ic = C(wc, tc), so Ic ⊈ JφKtc,fc,Ic and Ic ⊈
J¬φKtc,fc,Ic . By Overlap and Modal Bases, s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) = Ic. Since then
s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) ⊈ JφKtc,fc,Ic and s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) ⊈ J¬φKtc,fc,Ic , JWφKwc,tc,fc,Ic =
#; so J∇(Wφ)Kwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1
Fact 2. Where φ is non-modal, PAST φ c PAST (Wφ)
Proof. Suppose JPAST φKc = 1. Then there’s some t′ earlier than tc such that
JφKwc,t
′,fc,Ic = 1. By Circumstantial and Unsettled World, it follows that Ic ⊆
JφKt
′,fc,Ic . By Modal Bases and Overlap, we have s(Ic, f(w, t′)) = Ic. So there is
some t′ < tc, such that s(Ic, f(w, t′)) ⊆ JφKt
′,fc,Ic . So JPAST (Wφ)Kwc,tc,fc,Ic =
1.
Fact 3. ¬Wφ c W¬φ
Proof. Suppose J¬WφKc = 1. Since J¬WφKc = 1 is determinate, it must be that
either i) s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) ⊆ JφKtc,fc,Ic or ii) s(Ic, fc(wc, tc)) ⊆ J¬φKtc,fc,Ic . Case
i) is inconsistent with our initial assumption, so case ii) holds. That suffices for
JW¬φKc = 1
Fact 4. φ ∨ ψ c can φ ∨ can ψ.
Proof. Take φ and ¬φ. Suppose:
1. JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1
2. A(wc, tc) = {S tries to φ, S tries to ¬φ}
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3. S tries toφ and S tries to¬φ are consistent with both JφKtc,fc,Ic and J¬φKtc,fc,Ic
By 1, Jφ∨¬φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1. But the determinacy conditions for ⌜canφ⌝ are not met:
for noα ∈ Ac(wc, tc): α ⊆ JφKtc,fc,Ic orα ⊆ J¬φKtc,fc,Ic . Similarly the determinacy
conditions for ⌜can ¬φ⌝ are not met. So Jcan φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = Jcan ¬φKwc,tc,fc,Ic =#.
So φ ∨ ψ c can φ ∨ can ψ.
Note that, since validity entails diagonal validity, we also have φ∨ψ  can φ ∨ can
ψ.
Fact 5. For non-modal φ, PAST (φ) c PAST (can φ)
Proof. Suppose JPAST φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1. By our entry for PAST, there is some
t′ < t such that JφKwc,t′,fc,Ic = 1. By Circumstantial, C(w, t) ⊆ JφKt′,fc,Ic ; and by
Unsettled World, Ic ⊆ JφKt
′,fc,Ic . Now by Partition, we know that there is some
α ∈ Ac(wc, t
′, ) such that wc ∈ α. Action Time gives us that Ic ⊆ α.
Now we can show that s(Ic, fc(wc, t′) ∩ α) ⊆ JφKt
′,fc,Ic . By Modal Bases,
fc(wc, t
′)∩α = α. So Ic ⊆ fc(wc, t′)∩α. So, by Overlap, we have that s(Ic, fc(wc, t′)∩
α) = Ic. But we already know that Ic ⊆ JφKt
′,fc,Ic . So ∃α ∈ Ac(wc, t′) ∶ s(Ic, fc(wc, t′)∩
α) ⊆ JφKt
′,fc,Ic . Since φ is non-modal, JφKt′,fc,Ic = JφKt′,fαc ,Ic ; and so for some
t′ < tc, Jcan φKwc,t
′,fc,Ic = 1. So JPAST (can φ)Kc = 1.
Fact 6. When φ is non-modal, cannot φ c ¬φ
Proof. Suppose Jcannot φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1. Since it is determinate, either i) there is
some α ∈ Ac(wc, tc) such that JWφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 1; or ii) for all α ∈ Ac(wc, tc),
JWφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 0. Since Jcannot φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1, i) cannot hold. ii) and the de-
terminacy conditions forW gives us that for allα ∈ Ac(wc, tc), JW¬φKwc,tc,fc+α,Ic =
1. In other words, for all α ∈ Ac(wc, tc), s(Ic, fc(wc, tc) ∩ α) ⊆ J¬φKtc,fc,Ic .
By Partitionality, Circumstantial and Unsettled World, there’s someα ∈ Ac(wc, tc)
such that wc ∈ α. This, together with Modal Bases, ensures wc ∈ fα(wc, tc).
By Circumstantial and Unsettled World, we know wc ∈ Ic. By Overlap, we then
know wc ∈ s(Ic, fαc (wc, tc)). But then, since ∀α ∈ Ac(wc, tc), s(Ic, fc(wc, tc) ∩
α) ⊆ JφKtc,f
α
c ,Ic , wc ∈ JφKtc,f
α
c ,Ic , i.e. JφKwc,tc,fαc ,Ic = 1. When φ is non-modal,
JφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 1 iff JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1. So JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1.
Fact 7. Where φ is non-modal, φ c
Str
can φ
Proof. Suppose JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1 and Jcan φKwc,tc,fc,Ic is determinate. If Jcan
φKwc,tc,fc,Ic is determinate, then either i) there is some α ∈ Ac(wc, tc) such that
JφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 1; or ii) for all α ∈ Ac(wc, tc), JφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 0. By Partitionality,
we know that for some α, wc ∈ α. By reasoning analogous to that at the end of
42
the proof of Fact 6, if wc ∈ α, φ is non-modal, and JWφKwc,tc,f
α
c ,Ic = 0, then
JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 0. Since by supposition JφKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1, ii) cannot hold. So i)
must hold. But i) entails Jcan φKwc,tc,fc,Ic = 1
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